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INTRODUCTION

WHEN Principia Ethica appeared, in 1903, it became something of
a sacred text for the Cambridge-educated elite-Lytton Strachey,
Leonard Woolf, john Maynard Keynes-who, along with Virginia
Woolf, would form the core of the Bloomsbury Group. In a letter
of October 1 1, 1903, Strachey confesses to Moore that he is "carried away" by Principia, which inaugurates, for him, "the beginning
of the Age of Reason." Moore's critique of convention, his caustic
dismissal of his philosophical predecessors, and the relentless
rigor of his method promised a revolution in morality commensurate with the modernist transformation of art and literature.
Principia Ethica shifted the study of ethics away from normative
questions to issues of "metaethics," the study of ethical concepts.
Realism vs. relativism, the relation of goodness to rightness, and
the logic of moral argument would come to dominate philosophical ethics for the next century, even when Moore's philosophical
heirs differed from him in their conclusions. In this sense, Moore
established the methods and issues that would define AngloAmerican reasoning about ethics from W. D. Ross ( 1877-1971) to
Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) to john Rawls (1921-2002) to
Bernard Williams ( 1929-2003).
George Edward Moore didn't intend to be a philosopher. He was
born in 1873, the fifth of what would eventually be eight children of
devout evangelical parents. About the time he was twelve years old,
Moore himselfwent through an "ultra-evangelical" period, though,
according to his autobiography, "long before I left school, I was, to
use a word then popular, a complete Agnostic." Moore and his
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brothers attended Dulwich Academy in the London suburbs. He
excelled at Greek and Latin, and it was as a Classics scholar that
Moore went up to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1892. But by the
end of his freshman year his new friend Bertrand Russell was urging
Moore to take up philosophy. Moore was elected to the secret
Cambridge Conversazione Society, more commonly known as the
Apostles, the elite of the intellectual community at Cambridge.
Russell describes Moore's debut as "perfectly wonderful. ... He
looked like Newton and Satan rolled into one, each at the supreme
moment of his life." In 1898 he was elected to a six-year fellowship
at Trinity. In 192S Moore was appointed Professor of Philosophy at
Cambridge, a position which he held until his retirement in 1939.
He continued to write and lecture regularly until his death in 19S8.
In the early 196os, Moore was fondly, if comically, captured by
Jonathan Miller, in the voice of Bertrand Russell, as part of Beyond
the Fringe, the satirical revue made up, in addition to Miller, of
Peter Cook, Dudley Moore, and Alan Bennett.
Pnnczpia is an audacious work. The very title evokes Isaac
Newton's PhilosojJhiae Natura/is Principia Mathematica of 1687, the
founding document of modern physics (Russell and Whitehead
would do the same in their mm Principia Mathematica, the first volume of which would appear in 1910). Moore's famous first sentence is a withering condemnation of his predecessors:
It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of
which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple
cause: namely to attempt to answer questions, without
first discovering precisely what question it is which
you desire to answer.

Moore's method came variously to be known as "conceptual analysis,"
"linguistic analysis," and "ordinary language philosophy." Moore himself disdained these labels, but there is little doubt that, as a recent
commentator puts it, "the effect of Moore's position was to turn the
kind of philosophy done by some of his teachers on its head."
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One thing Moore isn't doing is semantics. Early on he insist~
that "verbal questions are properly left to the writers of dictionaries
and other persons interested in literature; philosophy, as we shall
see, has no concern with them." While he will discuss the definition
of"good" at some length, his "business is not with its proper use, as
established by custom." If language matters to philosophy, it is not
in the way it matters to linguists and lexicographer.
What we need, Moore begins, is "to distinguish clearly two kinds
of questions ....These two questions may be expressed, the first in
the form: What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?
The second in the form: What kind of actions ought we to perform?" Surprisingly, once you understand the first question, it turns
out that there are no practical reasons that justify ajudgment that
something is good for its own sake. The only reason for believing a
certain sort of thing ought to exist, just because of what it is, is the
immediate awareness of the goodness of the thing. If you attempted
to offer a justification- "because it helps others," "because it alleviates pain," even "because it proclaims the glory of God" -you would
be shifting the reason why it should exist away from what it is to
what it does. But that is the domain of the second question.
Since we do say that certain things are good in themselves, we
must be reacting to an immediate awareness of goodness. Moore's
term for this, taken from his teacher Henry Sidgwick, is "intuition." Moore is emphatically not attributing to himself, or to anyone, some occult or mystical ability. The contrasting term is
"inference." When we infer something we move from various bits
of evidence to a conclusion that was not immediately apparent. An
intuition-he will subsequently use the example of colors-is
immediately present, without need of inference. Look at a tomato,
your hand, or the face of your friend; there is no inference here.
Moore would say that you know what it is immediately.
Moore has no theory of where these intuitions come from or
how we learn to recognize them. He is simply drawing out the
implications of what we are committed to by the common-sense
ways we talk about our world. Nothing about our intuitions guar-

XI

INTRODUCTION

antees their truth. As Moore puts it, "in every way in which it is possible to cognise a true proposition, it is also possible to cognise a
false one." To say that something is true is to make a statement
about the way the world is, however we happened to learn it. This
is why Moore's view of ethics is a form of "realism."
The next thing to note is that good is simple; it has no parts.
Since it has no parts, it is not capable of definition. Moore offers
the analogy with "yellow." To say that yellow is a color isn't a definition. To say that it is a primary color merely locates it in a particular group of colors. We regularly perceive yellow, and most of us
can identifY the yellow things (as opposed, say, to the puce things)
in our visual field immediately and with remarkable accuracy.
"Good" works the same way. If someone offers a definition"good" means "pleasant"-it is always legitimate to object that
some things may be pleasant to some people, at some times, but
that doesn't necessarily mean that they are good. The would-be
definer has committed "the naturalistic fallacy."
Exposing the "naturalistic fallacy" is the heart of Moore's
project. A philosophically illuminating definition picks out
essential properties. To be pleased reports a psychological state,
achieved by particular persons in particular ways. It's easy
enough to see why it is confused with good; we often say of pleasant experiences that they are good. But when we're talking
philosophically, '"Pleased' means nothing but having pleasure."
We may not be able to define pleasure in any philosophically
enlightening way, but any mature user of the language knows
that "pleasure," or any other natural state you might want to substitute, is not necessarily "good."
Another way to put this is to say that it is always an open question whether some particular thing, or state, or activity is actually·
good. Moore considers "one of the more plausible, because one
of the more complicated," philosophical attempts to define
"good," namely "that to be good may mean to be that which we
desire to desire." The idea here is that we often desire things we
know we shouldn't. When we notice this, it's not uncommon to
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think we should really want something else instead. This looks
like distinguishing the real from the merely apparent good.
"But," Moore notes:
if we carry the investigation further, and ask ourselves
'Is it good to desire to desire A?' it is apparent, on a
little reflection, that this question is itself as intelligible as the original question 'Is A good?'-that we arc,
in fact, now asking for exactly the same information
about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly
asked with regard to A itself.
If it is always an open question whether or not desiring, loving, or
any other imaginable act relating to anything is good for a particular person, at a particular time, then "good" can't be defined in
the proposed terms. That needn't mean that particular states of
affairs can't be good, only that they can't, philosophically speaking, define the term.
Armed with these weapons-good as the simple object of intuition, the naturalist fallacy, and the open question argumentMoore turns his sights on the regnant schools of ethical theory.
The various versions of "naturalistic ethics typically commit the
naturalistic fallacy in its crudest form. Post-Darwinians of various
stripes identifY the good with some physical, social, or psychological state, but it "will always remain pertinent to ask, whether the
feeling itself is good; and if so, then good cannot itself be identical
with any feeling." The Utilitarian John Stuart Mill "has made as
naive and artless a use of the naturalistic fallacy as anybody could
desire." But even worse says Moore, in a caustic satire on Mill, he
has sold his "contemptible nonsense" to the public by trading on a
confusion between means and ends:
And the public haven't noticed. Yet this is certainly
what Mill has done. He has broken down the distinction between means and ends, upon the precise
observance of which his Hedonism rests. And he has
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been compelled to do this, because he has failed to
distinguish 'end' in the sense of what is desirable,
from 'end' in the sense of what is desired.
The Utilitarian maxim that the pleasure of the many should be
maximized seems to be about what is actually desired, but this naturally leads critics to ask whether or not what would please the
many is truly good.
In chapter four, having dispatched the various forms of "naturalistic ethics," Moore moves on to its "metaphysical" forms. The
main protagonists here are the idealists, a loose group having its
origins in Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804) and G. F. W. Hegel ( 177o1831 ), with their British followers T. H. Green ( 1836-t882), F. H.
Bradley (1846-1924), and Moore's teacher james M. E. McTaggart
(1866-1925). Moore describes as "metaphysical" the ethical theories which ground their positions in "something supersensible
which they inferred to exist, and which they held to be perfectly
good." This commits the naturalistic fallacy, ironically, by denying
that the physical world is really real and then identifying the good
with metaphysical reality. This not only commits Moore's key fallacy, it also reduces our earthly strivings to mere means of attaining that ultimate ideal. But if the metaphysician "holds, not only
that such an eternal reality exists, but also, as is commonly the
case, that notl1ing else is real ... then truly it will follow that nothing we can do will ever bring any good to pass." Metaphysical
ethics, then, is not only fallacious in its foundations, but it reduces
us to moral impotence.
Principia Ethica, through the first four chapters, is bracing stuff.
It is also, if you enjoy philosophical invective (e.g., Mill's "co~
temptible nonsense") pretty funny. But for the denizens of what
would become Bloomsbury, the best was last. Tom Regan records
that, "writing to Leonard Woolf just after Principia's publication,
Strachey enthuses about 'the last two chapters' (emphasis added),
proclaiming 'glory alleluiah!'" At first blush it seems hard to derive
from Principia "an ethic of individual liberation." Moore himself
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insists that "no dutiful action can possibly have unique value in the
sense that it is the sole thing of value in the world." This seems to
give us a very restricted and localized utilitarianism. Because we
can never really know whether a particular act is a duty, "a virtue, if
it is really a virtue, must be good as a means. .. but it is not better as a
means than non-virtuous dispositions; it generally has no value in
itself." The ultimate end, if there is one, is irrelevant. There is no
moral law. Virtue, philosophically speaking, is worthless.
And that, precisely, is where liberation lies. Moore provides
Strachey and his friends the philosophical justification for their
break with tradition, their disdain for middle-class morality, and
their embrace of what the early twenty-first century has come to call
alternative sexual lifestyles. The Bloomsberries (as Mary McCarthy
would come to call them) called it "buggery." "The arguments
offered in defence of Common Sense morality," writes Moore:
very often presuppose the existence of conditions,
which cannot be fairly assumed to be so universally
necessary as the tendency to continue life and to
desire property... this, for instance, seems to be the
case with most of the rules comprehended under the
name of Chastity."
Perhaps defenders of the middle-class status quo can't imagine any
viable alternative, but that, Moore seems to suggest, is their problem. As for providing a proper Christian upbringing, deep devotion
to the teachings of the church "may lead the believer to perform
actions of which the actual consequences, supposing no such God
to exist, may be much worse than he might otherwise have
effected." Since our duty is to encourage those acts that have some
probability of bettering the whole, "we should hesitate to encourage
the Love of God, in the absence of any proof that he exists."
What, then, is intrinsically good? "By far the most valuable
things, which we can know or can imagine," writes Moore, "are
certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as
the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiXV
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ful objects." Such a conclusion, particularly coupled with Moore's
reservations about God and chastity, might well have provoked
Strachey's "alleluiah!" Moore's ideal dovetails precisely with the
aesthetics of Clive Bell, Virginia Woolfs brother in law. The practical result was solidarity with like-minded friends. Everyone else
was a philistine.
Almost eighty years later, Alasdair Macintyre saw in this the rise
of an elite, aestheticized, emotivism:
Keynes emphasised the rejection not only of the
Benthamite version of utilitarianism and Christianity,
but of all claims on behalf of social action conceived
as a worthwhile end. What was left? The answer is: a
highly impoverished view of how 'good' may be used.
On Macintyre's account, Moore's assault on the tradition cut away
so much of our ordinary moral vocabulary that the Bloomsberries,
and the philosophical emotivists who were Moore's immediate
academic heirs, found themselves unable to invoke anything
beyond their own emotions and introspective judgments. What
contemporary neo-conservatives decry as the erosion of civic
virtue, and usually trace back to the tg6os, was, on this reading,
already in evidence at the tum of the twentieth century. Liberation
or solipsism? The question remains a matter of contentious debate,
but for many of the figures who define English modernism, its
theorist was G. E. Moore.
G. Scott Davis is the Lewis T. Booker Professor of Ethics and
Religion at the University of Richmond. He writes on moral theory, the history of ethics, and the ethics of war.
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